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Abstract 
 
The relevance of experimental games 
 
as methods in development research depends 
crucially on how far the results from the games can be extrapolated to real life, ie the 
external validity of those results. The extent to which external validity matters 
depends on what you want to do with the data, some kinds of theory testing can 
arguably afford indifference, but many experiments are used as an indicator of 
behaviour in everyday life. This paper is focused on the 15 cross-cultural studies of 
Henrich et al (2004) as the most systematic attempt by anthropologists to use 
experimental games in developing countries, to assess the extent to which such 
methods can illuminate norms and social preferences in reality. 
Key words: experimental methods, anthropology, gender, identities, developing 
countries, research methodology.   
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Engagement by anthropologists with the experimental methods of economics 
suggests a promising disciplinary partnership; the extension into cross cultural 
studies and a deepening of contextual understanding for economics, and into new 
forms of observation-based methods for anthropology. The set of 15 studies under 
MacArthur funding (Henrich et al 2004)1
 
 represent the best known and most 
influential of these, and they come to at least two surprising conclusions which 
stimulate the question of how experimental results relate to the social reality external 
to the experiment.   
The component studies are on the hunter gatherer and horticultural Conambo of 
Ecuador (Patton 2004), hunter gatherer and horticultural Machiguenga (Peru), 
subsistence farming Mapuche and wage working Huinca (Chile) (Henrich and Smith 
(2004), hunter-gatherer Hadza of Tanzania (Marlowe 2004), forager-horticultural 
Tsimane’ of Bolivia (Gurven), foraging and horticultural villagers in Papua New 
Guinea (Tracer), pastoral-nomadic Mongols and Kazakhs in Western Mongolia (Gil-
White 2004), Shona farmers in Zimbabwe (Barr, 2004), agro-pastoralist and farming 
Sangu of Tanzania (McElreath 2004), pastoralist Orma of Kenya (Ensminger 2004), 
hunter gathering  Ache of Paraguay (Hill and Gurven 2004) and Lamalera whalers of 
Indonesia (Alvard 2004). These studies are placed on an evolutionary scale from 
hunter-gatherers to complex agriculturalists, and are focused on variations in 
cultures of altruism and selfishness. The anthropological authors are derive from 
evolutionary anthropology and work largely with an explicit or implicit evolutionary 
psychology hypothesis that success has accrued to groups able to develop norms as 
guidelines for sharing, which fostered advantageous cooperation. The Henrich et al 
analysis compares the results from Dictator, Ultimatum and Public Goods games2
                                                 
1 These studies were all part of a programme which conducted the same games – Ultimatum, Dictator, 
and Public Goods Games – in 15 societies arranged in a sequence from simplest hunter-gatherers to 
complex agriculture. 
 
with those in the west, and the first surprising conclusion is that overall, higher 
levels of market integration are positively associated with ‘fairer’, less selfish 
behaviours. They argue that impersonal, large-scale, market-integrated societies 
require strong sharing and fairness norms because second-party enforcement is not 
possible, and this is why western subjects display relatively unselfish sharing in 
 
2 These are social preference games, played in anonymous pairs with real money.  In the Dictator 
game the proposer (who has the money) simply decides what amount to offer to the responder, and if 
completely self-interested should offer nothing. In the Ultimatum Game, the responder also decides 
whether to accept the offer, and if the offer is rejected then neither player receives any money. Self-
interested players should make low offers, and responders, few rejections.  Public Goods games 
involve players with money endowments making decisions whether to contribute to a group project 
which benefits all, even the non-contributors, and self-interested players should contribute nothing.  
(See Camerer and Fehr 2004: 60-78, for further details on games).  
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these games. The second surprising conclusion is that individual characteristics like 
gender have no, or very limited, influence on experimental behavior.    
 
Given the accounts of simple societies as eqalitarian and community oriented, 
compared to individualistic, selfish, competitive western cultures,  it was unexpected 
to find that, although Ultimatum games showed considerable variation3
 
,  ‘The self-
interest axiom accurately predicts responder behaviour for about half of our 
societies, even though it generally fails to predict the responder behaviour of 
university students.’ (Henrich 2004: 24). Many of the societies in the MacArthur 
studies are known for the high degree of sharing, compared to western societies, yet 
their members play the games more selfishly than western subjects. In explaining 
why societies with a high degree of sharing nevertheless exhibit selfish game play, 
Ensminger suggests that ‘self-enforcement need not develop when second party 
enforcement is ever-present’ (2004:359). This seems somewhat improbable, since 
second party enforcement is an ineffective approach, involving massive transaction 
costs, however small and face to face the group, as anyone who has ever had to 
enforce domestic labour by teenagers will know. Further, the implication that small-
scale societies have fewer norms feels equally improbable.  
The second surprising conclusion of Henrich et al, is that individual characteristics 
(occupation, age, gender etc) do not explain game behaviour variations. Whether 
markets undermine the moral foundations of society, as Marx thought, or 
alternatively, stimulate honesty and fair dealing, we should surely see distinctive 
behavior in the games from those individuals most involved in markets. However, 
we do not, overall, see this connection at individual level4
 
, and exactly how the 
evolution of unselfish norms in market relations is supposed to evolve is unclear.  
One would expect that individuals with very different social positions and life 
experiences, women, men, the young or elderly, the rich, the poor, educated and 
uneducated, those with different livelihood bases, and so on, would relate to the sets 
of norms supposedly at play in relation to particular games in distinctive ways, and 
this would be reflected in how they played the games. The factors considered in the 
MacArthur studies are sex, age, education, and wealth, and in pooled regressions on 
all offers none of these attributes predicted offers5
                                                 
3 Variability is higher in these studies than among western subjects – and one PNG society rejected 
both very low and very high offers with equal frequency (Henrich et al 2004: 19). 
.  
 
4 Although Ensminger for the Orma finds that those engaged in wage labour and trade were more 
likely to engage in fair behaviour than subsistence producers, which she sees as related to the 
importance of reputation in market oriented societies. 
 
5 But this ‘does not exclude the possibility that the individual differences we have measured may 
predict behaviours in different ways from group to group’ (Henrich 2004: 28). 
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First, how exactly was the connection between game behavior and external reality 
conceived? Henrich et al are ‘convinced that local economic and social structures are 
reflected in the experimental behaviors we observed’ (2004: 48) and offer two 
possible ways in which this occurs. One is that environments produce distinctive and 
generalized behavioural dispositions which apply across many domains, so that one 
group may be generally more altruistic than another. This however would imply 
similar behavior in differing games which is not evident in the component studies. 
And that similar environments would produce similar dispositions which is also not 
evident. Their second, and favoured pathway, is to see games as cueing highly 
context-specific behavioural rules, in which ‘our subjects were first identifying the 
kind of situation they were in, seeking analogs in their daily life, and then acting in 
an appropriate manner.’ (2004: 48). Whilst recognizing that it is difficult to 
distinguish which of these two pathways explain the results, the case of the Orma in 
Kenya is used to argue in favour of the context-specific trigger of norms governing 
everyday life. ‘The Orma’ are said to have made a connection between the Public 
Goods game and harambee, a local cooperative institution which wealthier members 
contribute more than poorer ones, and in the game behavior also found higher 
contributions from wealthier members. In the account of study methods for the 
Orma research, Ensminger makes it clear, however, that it was not the Orma subjects 
but the research assistants who made the connection between the public goods game 
and harambee (‘when the game was first described to my research assistants they 
immediately identified it as the harambee game’ (2004:376). If a game is labelled in this 
manner, the framing is so complete that it would be surprising if players did not do 
what was expected in harambee. Neither the ‘generalised disposition’ or the ‘context-
specific norms’ pathways, suggested as the basis of external validity, stack up against 
the many contradictions and questions evident in the component studies, and 
discussed further below.   
 
These issues prompted a questioning of how researchers using experimental 
methods connect game behaviour evidence with the social reality they are analyzing, 
ie the issue of external validity. How is the presence and strength of sharing norms, 
measured in the Dictator and Ultimatum games, extrapolated to external reality? 
And how are social identities, known to be important in patterning behavior, left at 
the door of the lab, and unimportant in game decisions?  I will first discuss the 
absence of connection of experimental results to individual social identity, with a 
focus on gender, before considering what approaches would help understand the 
variable degrees of external validity which experimental games might hold. For this 
purpose, the framework of Levitt and List (2007) is used to set out the factors which 
are seen by economists as distorting the external validity of game results, and which 
is then extended with a discussion of the deeper contextual and theoretical issues 
which a social anthropological sensibility might see as important for the claims made 
form experimental game results.  
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1. Gender identities and game behaviour: 
 
The big differences found in the MacArthur game behaviours were between, not 
within, groups, and the overall conclusions about market integration and sharing 
norms are arrived at through ranking of societies in an index composed of ‘payoffs to 
cooperation’ ie the extent of reliance on cooperation outside family level; ‘market 
integration’ ie extent of dependence on markets; ‘anonymity’ ie the extent to which 
people interact with strangers they may never see again; ‘privacy’ ie how possible it 
is to keep secrets from others; and ‘sociopolitical complexity’ ie how much 
centralised decision-making occurs above the level of the household.  
 
Evolutionist explanations require some kind of material advantage to accrue to 
particular social behaviours (eg cooperation) in order for them to be selectively 
favoured through reproductive success6
 
. But how exactly do some ‘lifeways’ prove 
more adaptive and successful, if not through the changed behaviours of individuals, 
for example traders and wage labourers within any particular group displaying 
norms and preferences in the games appropriate to market integrated societies, ie 
less selfishness and greater willingness to punish? Or, if exposure to markets and 
market relations leads people to make higher offers and more frequent rejections, one 
would imagine that women in simple societies, who are usually much less market 
integrated than men, would make lower offers and fewer rejections. But it appears 
that they do not. We see little or no evidence of changed behaviours of individuals 
within groups.  
It is surprising that age, sex, education and relative wealth do not affect offers or the 
likelihood of a subject rejecting an offer. With a few group-specific exceptions, no 
individual characteristic other than group membership (village, camp etc) predicted 
experimental play. And even though market integration has such a major effect at 
group level this does not emerge in individual level measures – the behaviours of 
players with more or less involvement in wage labouring or cash cropping is not 
distinctive.7
 
  
Gender identity is generally treated rather casually by the researchers in the 
MacArthur studies, eg Henrich and Smith (2004) remark in an aside that their 
generalisation about the absence of livelihood cooperation for the Mapuche is not 
                                                 
6 Eg Gil-White says that the puzzle of players overestimating the rejection rate is explained by their 
neuroses about their reputations and the fear of being seen as a bad person, despite the fact that 
nothing much seems to befall such bad people. This in turn is explained by ecological adaptation to 
low population density and herding livelihoods.  
 
7 In the one case where it did, the effect was that offers were higher amongst wage labourers) (Henrich 
et al 2004:35)7.  
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true for female headed households, but there is no pursuit of this, suggesting a rather 
selective account of the cooperation context. In addition, there is not a discussion of 
what is labelled as ‘cooperation’, what is identified as sharing, and so on. Marriage is 
an important and variable form of cooperation in all societies, with very different 
kinds and levels of gender and generation cooperation in production and 
consumption, and in self-interest and altruism, but domestic intrahousehold 
cooperation is excluded from accounts of cooperation contexts and cultures. There 
are deeper difficulties too; the identification of some behavior as ‘pro-social’, or 
‘other-regarding’, is part of a dichotomized perspective on social worlds which is 
difficult to reconcile with more complex anthropological views of societies as held 
together through conflict, or of self-interest as including the wellbeing of others.  
 
It also seems curious that gender identity does not emerge as a significant factor in 
these game results, given the extensive work showing how deeply gender influences 
research encounters, and that women show distinctive preferences in ‘mountains of 
research in psychology and sociology’ (Eckel 2008) where they appear to be more 
altruistic and cooperative and less competitive than men. In a comprehensive review 
of experimental game results and gender in western societies, a complex picture 
emerges, but a strong case is made for the greater sensitivity of women to framing 
effects and context (Croson and Gneezy 2009), and Eckel’s review (2008: 10-12) shows 
that women give more to anonymous counterparts in Dictator games, are more likely 
to accept offers in Ultimatum games, and men are more likely to punish unfair offers, 
while women’s offers are more likely to be accepted as fair by both women and men.  
 
There were moments in particular studies where gender was statistically significant 
in some elements of the games – eg in minimal acceptable offers to Conambo 
(Ecuador) women, where women accepted lower offers than men (Patton 2004:107)8
                                                 
8 In this study, although sex was as important as location/identity, the analysis does not follow it up. 
. 
In the Bolivian study men offered, on average, rather more than women (Gurven 
2004:215) and middle-aged women were significantly higher contributors to the 
public goods game.  In the Ache study all the high Ultimatum Game offers were 
made by women, but whilst many of the highest Public Goods contributions are 
made by women the statistics finally showed men making significantly higher 
contributions than women (Hill and Gurven 2004: 398). In PNG Tracer (2004: 248) 
finds women’s offers higher than men’s, and women less likely to accept both very 
high and very low offers than men and, while not statistically significant, he 
concludes that this supports Eckel and Grossman’s (1998) dictator game findings 
amongst western subjects that women tend to be more generous and less 
individually orientated than men. But in the Hadza study where gender is almost 
significant (Marlowe 2004: 185) in predicting offers, women as dictators offered less. 
In a number of studies gender appears at first glance to differentiate behaviour, but 
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this generally all comes out in the statistical wash, and gender was rarely significant 
in explaining behaviour.  
 
The absence of significance of individual characteristics like gender seems surprising 
because norms of appropriate behavior are so frequently gender differentiated, in 
relation to divisions of labour as well as symbolic constructions of gender. If a 
division of labour excludes women from, say, hunting game, then why would a 
norm for sharing hunting meat be exercised by women as well as men? One might 
argue that there are meta norms drawn on by women and men operating above the 
level of particular contexts like the hunt, but the analysis offered is in terms of very 
context specific norms, where one might be surprised that both genders equally 
deploy such a norm. The experimental anthropologist’s fondness for explaining 
game play as deriving from norms which are grounded in the micro material realities 
of the cultures in which they are embedded feels at odds with insignificance of 
individual characteristics. For example, education of individuals in the MacArthur 
studies does not prove significant in explaining play, yet it most certainly alters 
norms and aspirations.  
 
The absence of significance of gender in game play is also at odds with the external 
realities described. Most authors describe marked gender divisions of labour in the 
cultures studied, and Tracer, in the PNG study, describes the cultural environment as 
one in which gender marks strong divisions (men and women sleep separately, 
women are prohibited from spirit and meeting houses, men are fearful and anxious 
in relation to women who cause illness, sap energy, and diminish hunting ability, 
2004: 238-9). One might therefore expect women and men to connect to dominant 
norms rather differently.  
 
In addition to the connections between specific individual’s livelihoods and game 
play, we might expect broader gender effects on play from society-wide gender 
ideologies and socialisation.  Whilst puzzling over the contradictory results of his 
games in general, Gil-White remarks that ‘the logic of the game may be easier to 
grasp for those who are socialised into the proposer role’ (2004: 274). If women are 
connected to the prevailing male dominated cultural vocabularies and norms in 
subaltern ways then we would expect some reflection in game behaviour, if indeed 
game behaviour does have external validity. Certainly we might expect that women, 
who are generally less likely to be doing the proposing in relation to resource 
sharing, would find it harder to grasp the game and may make offers more divergent 
from the prevailing norms, yet Gil-White like others finds no significant gender 
effects on play.  
 
After dismissing the significance of individual characteristics, the MacArthur authors 
look at group differences, which are felt to influence play more clearly than 
individual differences, yet these also produced some surprising results. Group effects 
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were found to be strong even where groups are not geographically isolated, thus the 
Quichua and the Achuar of Ecuador interact and intermarry but played the 
Ultimatum Game very differently (2004:36)9
 
. And unexpectedly, given other 
experimental evidence on the readiness with which groupness affects behaviour in 
western subjects, Gil-White finds no in-group favouritism in offers and acceptances 
in the Mongolian study (2004: 281). 
The results on group differences however leads Henrich to the view that ‘Group-
level measures of economic and social structure statistically explain much of the 
between-group variation in experimental play. This suggests that there might be a 
relationship between behaviour in our games and common patterns of interaction in 
daily life.’ (2004:38). He goes on to say that ‘[B]etween group behavioural 
differences…. are the product of the pattern of social and economic interaction that 
frame the everyday lives of our subjects (2004:45)’. But why and how? If the 
everyday lives and patterns of social interaction of individuals do not explain 
anything, then how do group attributes? If it is some functional material reality 
which is at the root of all these explanations then how is it, by the same logic, that the 
specific material circumstances of individuals have no effect on play? 
 
To summarise; the absence of significance of individual characteristics on play is 
puzzling and begs a number of questions. How are the connections between 
quotidian realities, norms and game play supposed to work if the functional logic 
fails? Has enough attention been paid to forms of conjugal and intrahousehold 
cooperation? There is a lot of evidence that women and men relate to hegemonic 
norms differently at a number of levels; livelihoods and material realities, relations to 
money and markets, subjective conceptions of rights and personal self-interest, 
behavioural ideals, and the symbolic vocabulary of their worlds and lifeways. Why 
does this find no reflection in play? These puzzles suggest a closer look at the claims 
for external validity of experimental game results.  
 
 
2. External validity in experimental economics: 
 
Amongst mixed discipline audiences, encountering experimental methods afresh, the 
first question always raised is what relevance the behaviour in experimental games 
has for everyday social behaviour, since the experiment is such an artificial situation. 
Oddly, to a social anthropologist, the relationship between experimental results and 
external reality has not excited very much interest in economics, perhaps because the 
ideal of the science laboratory is so methodologically pervasive, and in many 
sciences objects behave the same in a lab as outside it. Even where a gap between 
                                                 
9 In this comparison the cooperative and market experienced Quichua played less generously than the 
Achuar. 
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laboratory and real life is recognised, Guala remarks that ‘[e]xperimental economists 
… tend to ignore or downplay the issue of external validity’, and concentrate on 
experimental design (2005: 142) for several reasons.  One argument is that where 
experiments are used to reject theories it does not matter how realistic they are since 
it is assumed that a failure of theory to predict in a lab situation will entail a certain 
failure in reality. This however assumes that the experiment is an adequate test by 
itself, to allow theory rejection, a confidence which would not be shared by many 
non-economists since the experiment may be at fault not the theory. And 
furthermore, the connection to reality of positive results from experiments is not 
helped with this position. Finally, the preoccupation with the dirty test tube problem, 
ie with ensuring that experimental results are not spoiled by design errors 
confounding analysis may also have worsened improve external validity, since there 
is a trade-off between internal and external validity in experimental design; ‘The 
more artificial the environment, the better for internal validity; the less artificial, the 
better for external purposes.’ (Guala 2005: 144).  
 
A useful framework for considering how far insights gained from lab behaviour can 
be extrapolated to the real world has been proposed by Levitt and List (2007) who 
are interested, in their discussion of the class of experiments dealing with social 
preferences, in what ‘distorts’ lab behaviour, and who categorise distortions limiting 
external validity, into 5 areas, which are discussed next before raising further 
methodological questions about external validity from an anthropological stance.  
 
2.1 Moral and ethical considerations 
 
Decisions made by individuals reflect both the financial costs and benefits of 
alternative actions, and the moral costs or benefits of those actions. A decision at 
odds with a person’s moral code or sense of identity carries costs, and the stronger 
the norm involved the more likely it is to dominate the financial pay-off, and 
conversely the greater the financial pay off the more likely it is for moral concerns to 
be set aside. Levitt and List conclude that ‘games where the moral and the wealth-
maximising choices are in conflict (eg experiments measuring social preferences) are 
likely to yield experimental results which diverge most sharply from real world 
behaviour.’ (2007:29). These are the games that social development researchers are 
likely to be most interested in, and yet they are the most vulnerable to distortion 
effects. In addition, the balance of this trade-off is much less knowable for non-
western cultures where different moral codes are at work, and where the value of 
any particular financial pay-off is also uncertain. Experiments on social preferences 
in developing countries therefore should carry a particularly stringent health 
warning. 
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2.2 The nature and extent of scrutiny 
 
Lab behaviour is subject to scrutiny which exaggerates pro-social behaviours, eg 
hand washing in lavatories is more common when people think themselves 
observed. The same people that display what look like pro-social preferences (eg 
donations to charity) in experimental conditions, are found not to behave in similar 
ways outside of the experiment. However, the significance of this depends on the 
type of experiment, and scrutiny is seen as ‘a minor problem in many experiments, 
especially if the decision environment is interactive and ‘rich’’ (Falk and Heckman 
2009: 7).  
 
Scrutiny may bias towards pro-social behaviour (Hoffman 1994), and even signals 
like eye-shaped images on instruction forms increases cooperative behaviour 
(Hayley and Fessler 2005). However removing the perception of scrutiny is very 
difficult, and even if this is possible, there is a great deal of variability of pro-social 
behaviour outside of experimental conditions, and little evidence of general 
consistency of behaviour – one context may stimulate a display of pro-social 
preferences and another may not – such that it is far from clear which norms are 
responsible for pro-social behaviour in an experiment. Even more challenging is the 
evidence for the temporality of pro-social acts in everyday life, discussed further 
below. 
 
Anonymity (both of researcher and players, and between players) is a general rule in 
experimental methods. It affects behaviour, since less anonymity produces more pro-
social behaviours. Anonymity of play is expected to remove the possibility that 
players behave in ways which they think they ought to, and mindful of their 
reputations. It has however been problematic in many of the MacArthur studies; in 
the Ache games in Paraguay (Hill and Gurven 2004: 394) the pay-offs were not really 
private and everyone knew that the (very well known) researcher knew how they 
had played, Alvard in the Indonesian study notes that talk between players was 
impossible to control, before and after the games, McElreath says that players often 
announced their offers or contributions on leaving the room (2004: 340), the Ache are 
unfamiliar with ‘the possibility of anaonymous behaviours without social 
consequences (Hill and Gurven 2004: 402) and behaved similarly in public and 
private versions of the Publid Good games, and Ensminger for the Kenya study, 
points out that where guaranteed anonymity is very rare in everyday life, people 
may behave as if it does not exist.  
 
The absence of a belief in the anonymity of the game may be part of why reputation 
management seems to be an important element in some game play, even though this 
does not necessarily mean behaving altruistically. Henrich and Smith’s players all 
knew each other and the researcher well, so may have had reason to question 
anonymity, yet they still cooperated less than the US students interacting with 
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strangers (2004: 156). This prompts a questioning of the ethnocentrism of the 
experimenters belief that anonymity and privacy, based in western dichotomies of 
public and the private, and grounded in western lifeways and histories. Behaviour 
frontstage and backstage, in Goffman’s terms, is very clearly delineated within 
western cultures, but possibly less, or differently, so, in others. Both Tanzanian 
Hadza (Marlowe 2004), and the PNG Au and Gnau (Tracer 2004: 240) were said to 
try to avoid sharing meat from hunting by sneaking into the village under darkness, 
and the former have so little everyday privacy that trousers are valued by Hadza 
men for having pockets which allow things to be kept in secret (Marlowe 2004:188). 
In these circumstances a game offering a treasured opportunity not to share cannot 
be seen as reflecting everyday norms.  Marlowe argues that it is different kinds of 
privacy in complex societies which allow us to limit sharing; the Hadza share 
because of the impossibility of concealment.  
 
Where very little is private, secret or anonymous, the stripping out of reputation-
oriented decisions is not so easy. Another factor is aversion to lying. Privacy should 
allow people to act in ways which they may not wish to defend publically, by lying 
with impugnity.  But lying well, with people you know intimately, is not easy: in 
discussion after the game Ache would have to lie convincingly to relatives and 
friends, and ‘would be very uncomfortable at the thought of having to lie under 
these circumstances, and might therefore make fair offers because they knew they 
would be asked about their offer after the game ended.’ (Hill and Gurven (2004: 404) 
 
Even if player anonymity is secure there is nothing to prevent a player imagining 
their partner, as a consequence of the game framing, or simply creating a projection – 
as in the Zimbabwean woman player, who explained her acceptance of a zero offer 
by saying that only someone in dire need would have made such an offer, and so she 
had accepted it (Barr 2004: 319).  
 
Economists and anthropologists may see the public and the private rather differently.  
Why should we expect that anonymity will make people behave completely 
differently in public and private, and might this have been exaggerated? The fact that 
‘no-one will know’ does not cancel out the social elements of personal identities. 
People enact their cultures even when alone. What is social in us resides in our 
personhood, and is not only performed when others are present. Toilet users may be 
less likely to wash their hands when unobserved, but they are very likely to observe 
many other conventions, like closing the door. Furthermore, the self is part of the 
audience for behaviour. How we feel about ourselves is an ever-present check on 
how we act.  
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2.3. Framing and context  
 
The classic work in economics on framing emphasises the ways that information may 
be coded positively or negatively by the words used to convey it (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981), called valence framing, for example, in a risk experiment whether 
one talks about the risk of lives lost or lives saved induces different levels of risk 
aversion. Levin at al (1998) review literature on framing and suggest a typology of 
‘risky choice framing’ referring to how the outcomes are described, ‘attribute 
framing’10 referring to the manipulation of a characteristic of an event or object in the 
game, and ‘goal framing’11
 
 referring to the way the goal is labelled (1998: 150) in 
order to show systematic effects of types of framing. This is useful but the range and 
depth of framing recognised by social scientists goes well beyond positive and 
negative framing (Jackson 2009, 2010). 
More recently, Benz and Meier comment on context more clearly by observing that 
‘Social norms may be triggered very differently in context-free and context-rich 
environments’ (2008:269). The question of how much to cue the domain which one is 
researching - in the way the experiment is explained to players - is tricky; too little 
and you may not be triggering the norms you are interested in; too much and you 
may induce expected behaviour (Charness and Kuhn 2010).  However these debates 
focus on how the experimenter knowingly manipulates the frame, and not on the 
unknown framing brought into the experiment by the players.   
 
In their discussion of framing Levitt  and List refer to the Henrich studies and seem 
to both accept the external validity claim yet also remark on the degree of 
uncontrolled framing by their subjects; if ‘an experimenter mistakenly assumes that 
the agent is treating the game as one-shot then reputation building behaviour can be 
misconstrued [by the experimenter] as social preferences’ (2007 :163). But if subjects 
are not playing the game the researchers think they are playing, then what meaning 
do you give to the results, let alone accepting that these results are consistent with 
everyday behaviour?  Western researchers running experiments in other cultures, 
cannot really see their experiments on a continuum of ‘context-free’ to ‘context-rich’ 
as Benz and Meier suggest, but more realistically is actually context-ignorant, or 
context-confused, and raises major questions for the interpretation of results.  
 
The creativity with which players frame games for themselves is little commented 
upon. Alvard however observes that ‘’Experimenters simplify the real world, create 
                                                 
10 For example, meat is more likely to be evaluated positively if labelled ‘75% lean’ compared to ‘25% 
fat’.  
 
11 For example, framing the same scenario outcome differently shows subjects are more willing to go 
accept breast self-examination if the same outcomes are described negatively compared to positively 
(1998: 168), ie negative goal framing is more persuasive.   
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the rules of a game, and have faith that their subjects play by them. Players may view 
the experiment  in a different way – as a game within a game…the larger game does 
not end with the experiment.’ (2004:422). The obvious framing which is not discussed 
by Levitt and List or others, is that lab contexts and experiments are much more 
unfamiliar to non-western subjects, much more familiar are actual games. Calling an 
experiment a game, has significant framing entailments (Jackson 2010).  In the 
MacArthur studies there are a number of suggestions that this was the case; the 
comments on how enjoyable the games were because they were fun (Henrich and 
Smith 2004: 128), the joking during games (Hill and Gurven 2004: 390) the game 
explanation by researchers to players in terms of a ‘fun game for real money’ 
(Ensminger 2004: 366), the comment made on Ache perceptions of the game as 
gambling, and observation that one of the most notorious gamblers in the 
community had contributed very highly to the public good game and was heard to 
remarking after the game that he had hoped to double his money (Hill and Gurven 
2004: 407). High acceptances of low offers were sometimes explained by players in 
terms of just the bad luck of ending up a responder rather than a proposer (Gurven 
2004: 222, and Henrich and Smith 2004: 142), and finally, remarks about game 
payoffs were seen as windfall money – just as game winning are. 
 
Excessive framing by researchers is seen in the Ache study where players were 
puzzled about why they would reject an Ultimatum offer, and ‘we specifically stated 
that if the respondent believed the division of the stake was unfair ..he might reject 
the offer (Hill and Gurven 2004: 391), which tells players how to react, or the Orma 
case in the labelling of the public goods game as harambee.  
 
2.4. Self selection of players 
 
It is clearly important to eliminate distortions and biases arising from the distinctive 
character of those who volunteer for games, where subjects are not sampled 
systematically. Volunteers have long been known to have ‘more education, higher 
occupational status, earlier birth position, lower chronological age, higher need for 
approval and lower authoritarianism than non- volunteers’ (Doty and Silverthorne 
1975), so it seems curious that self-selection has been acceptable in experimental 
practice.  Levitt and List also remark that the evidence that women are more pro-
social than men may be due to their distinctive behaviour in menstrual phases. 
Women volunteers are more often ovulating (when they are elated and active) than 
non-volunteers, and they cite evidence that women in experiments on bid the same 
as men in auctions when they are menstruating, but differently from men when 
experiencing higher oestrogen levels.   
 
A move away from use of volunteers might seem a ready solution to this area of 
distortion but even where systematic sampling is used to obtain subjects there are 
social pressures working against too much certainty of representativeness. In 
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developing countries the context of poverty, and the use of real money in 
experimental games, can create enormous desire for inclusion (Jackson 2009) and 
local gatekeepers facilitating the conduct of experiments, and managing the 
construction of sample frames, recognise a useful opportunity for patronage – which 
can easily lead to non-representative participation in games. How to deal with the 
effects of women’s oestrogen cycles is less clear. 
 
2.5. Stakes of the game 
 
The use of real money in experiments is also linked to economist ideas about the 
external validity of results. Real money produces real behaviour. Thus Vernon Smith 
writes, ‘the laboratory becomes a place where real people earn real money for 
making real decisions.’ (1976:275) A fundamental defence of experimental methods 
rests on the idea that ‘While surveys can provide large and representative data sets 
that provide statistical power, experiments allow the elicitation of preferences and 
attitudes in a controlled and incentive compatible way, as participants have to make 
choices with real money at stake.’ (Falk and Heckman 2009: 9).  
 
Experimental economists are generally committed to using real money for several 
reasons; because ‘we feel confident that most people care about it, and that we all 
want more’ (Guala 2005:236); because it is assumed to be universally attractive; and 
because it is consumed by an individual. Money is also thought to have a positive 
effect on the veracity of experiments by inducing cognitive exertion (subjects try 
harder when money is at stake), by increasing motivational focus so that behaviours 
are easier to interpret, and by emotional triggers - since subjects can behave 
differently confronted with real money, rather than imagined money (Read 2005).  
 
Levitt and List argue that the larger the stake the more likely it is to dominate moral 
concerns in experimental behaviour. Benz and Meier (2008) think the effect of the 
stake on the experiment turns not only on stake size, but also whether the money is 
earned or obtained in a trivial way. Are these, however, western preoccupations – ie 
entitlement depends on effort, and more is always better?  Anthropologists would 
approach the use of real money rather differently, and begin with assuming that 
money is not a uniform, abstract and universal currency but one freighted with 
symbolism, and meaning, and of differential value to subjects. Money based 
exchange, is no longer ringfenced and contrasted with the exchange of gifts in ‘a 
‘great divide’ between the monetary and pre-monetary worlds’ (Bloch and Parry 
1989:29), and it cannot be treated as obliterating the rich symbolic and social 
entailments of other forms of exchange. Money has a concrete materiality, notes of 
different denominations have character and nicknames (interestingly,  often being 
named after car models), the Bank of Colombia has a major problem with the 
defacing of banknotes through their use for love notes or drawing on, and Iran too 
political defacement is common (Guardian  2010). Money has symbolic and magical 
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meanings and power (Miller 2005), it is evidently scarce in poor communities of the 
south, and especially so for particular social groups with limited access to monetized 
relations. Interestingly, the form of money, notes or coins, has also been observed in 
western experiments to have an impact on game decisions (Smith, 2009, pers. comm.)  
The value of the stakes was relatively very high in many of the MacArthur studies, 
eg 10 days wages for Alvard (2004: 418), the scarcity of money commented on as well 
as the effects of money as the medium of pay-off – Marlowe argues that Hadza food 
is shared because it cannot be concealed, money is not because it can be hidden 
(2004: 189).   
 
If money is integrated into other forms of exchange, and has symbolic and cultural 
character, then we have to consider what meanings and institutions and norms are 
triggered by the use of money in the games, and therefore what rules might be 
reflected in offers, acceptances and rejections. The laboratory is not a neutral 
impersonal context, the money is not an abstract and uniform medium of exchange, 
and we do not know how the location, the experimenters, the other players and the 
currency itself was construed by the subjects. I would guess that the high degree of 
variability in the data from non-western societies derives in part from the highly 
variable ways in which people struggled to identify the context and expectations.  
 
Guala argues that experimental evidence cannot, alone, bridge the gap between real-
world and hypothesis being tested, as, from a different position, does Jackson (2009). 
Empirical research is needed both before the experiment to ensure the relevant 
aspects of the real world, and a precise specification, are built into the experimental 
design, and after the experiment to look for evidence of the same relationships in the 
real world. Experiments need representative sampling of the relevant population and 
must also mirror conditions and environments.  The trade-off is that experimental 
results are more reliable when conditions are more artificial, but have more external 
validity when they are less artificial. Taking external validity seriously implies an 
important role for empirical research before and after the experiment. ‘[T]he external 
validity problem is empirical in character and must be solved by appropriately 
combining field and laboratory evidence.’ (Guala 2005: 160).  
 
 
3. External validity in the MacArthur studies 
 
In the overview essay on the 15 MacArthur studies, Henrich is confident that play in 
games has external validity and parallels real life, but reading the individual studies 
gives a different impression – that this is at best a strained connection, that the 
parallels are highly selective and speculative, and that the precise ways which social 
institutions and norms produce particular game behaviours is not clear. Connections 
made between games behaviours and external reality were quite variable, and more 
indirect or absent than the overview essay indicates. Some like Ache Indians of 
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Paraguay are known for their extensive food sharing and cooperative food 
acquisition (Hill and Gurven 2004: 387), yet their game behaviour shows no 
relationships between food sharing or food production and cooperation. Others, like 
Henrich and Smith (2004: 159) talk up the external validity of their study, arguing 
that  the ethnographic data supports their game results as the hunter gathering 
Machiguenga are individualistic, independent, do not punish or monitor, and do not 
cooperate - and this accords with their game behaviour of low offers and few 
rejections of offers. 
 
Claims for external validity are very selective. The non-cooperative gaming of the 
swidden agricultural Mapuche, whilst very different in their fear of witchcraft and 
envy, belief in punishment and retribution, is seen as connected to a similar absence 
of cooperation. They note Mapuche cooperation over religious festivals, but claim 
this is not ‘cued’ by the games because they are administered by outsiders, there is an 
absence of ritual content, and the game is a cashbased transaction. They also mention 
that livelihood cooperation does exist in female-headed households, but no analysis 
of play by such subjects is offered. Thus very different societies produce the same 
kinds of game play because both are selectively represented as somehow essentially 
non-cooperative, and where cooperation exists, it can be discounted by the 
suggestion that the framing of the game limits the field of norms to those of interest 
to the researcher. Such confidence in the precision and certainty over exactly what 
players thought they were doing in the game seems misplaced.   
 
 
3.1 Cultural context, game design and the interpretation of evidence:  
 
Guala (2005) argues that empirical research prior to experiments is needed to ensure 
that there a precise hypothesis formulated for expected behaviour, and that the most 
salient features of the external reality are built into the game design. It implies that 
the comparative use of common games in different cultures is very problematic, since 
salient features of differing cultures cannot be built into a standard game. The 
MacArthur studies were conducted by researchers with extensive knowledge of their 
sites, but the use of standard Dictator and Ultimatum  Games, designed in western 
contexts, across all sites for comparability purposes, means that salient features of 
particular cultures are not built into game design. Further, it is assumed that offers 
and rejections in games everywhere equate to the same thing – degrees of selfishness, 
of pro-social behavior, or willingness to punish the breaking of sharing norms, whilst 
there is evidence that the ways offers and rejections were conceived was very 
culturally specific in the MacArthur studies.  In such circumstances it is difficult to 
know how the game behavior connects to the external reality, and what behaviours 
mean. 
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Rejection levels are shown to reflect a lot more than willingness to punish norm 
infringements, as the Ultimatum game is supposed to show. Low levels of rejection 
are seen as possibly connected to reputation fears, and a reluctance to be seen as 
confrontational – which rejecting a gift would be – for the Ecuador study (Patton 
2004: 120).  A rejection here amounts to an accusation of meanness and a spiteful act 
to punish it, thus women are less likely to reject, as are those in weaker coalitions. 
Here rejection levels may indeed be seen as showing the weakness of a sharing norm, 
but this is generated by a fear of confrontation, which is altogether different from the 
rejection levels of western students. In a nother study, Hill and Gurven argue that 
‘the Ache failed to reject offers because to do so would be a form of serious 
interpersonal confrontation…[When a person is offered a very small meat share they 
will not confront the divider but].. instead the recipient grumbles to other members 
of the social group about the size of the share, thus damaging the reputation of the 
sharer.’ (2004:404-5). Infringement of sharing norms in this contexts is dealt with 
through mechanisms other than outright rejection – it does not signal the weakness 
of a sharing norm because subjects are unwilling to punish an infringement within the 
game. 
 
The high offers in PNG (Tracer 2004: 252), compared to other studies, is seen as 
related to the cultural emphasis on generosity, and the exceptionally high rejection 
rate to the desire to avoid incurring unwanted obligations by accepting offers – in 
spite of assurances of anonymity. In this study and in others it is clear that players 
did not really believe in anonymous play, a situation discussed below. Here, requests 
to be given things have to be complied with, and people are shunned if they refuse. 
Unsolicited giving binds individuals together too, with an implied debt, and thus 
gifts may be refused if the receiver prefers not to be so indebted. Rejections were 
accompanied by statements such as ‘‘I can take the K3 I received from you [the turn-
up payment], I can’t take money from someone in the village…’ When offered sums 
above K5 they often seemed genuinely afraid, and on several occasions responders 
remarked ‘no, that’s too much.’’ (Tracer 2004: 255). Here rejection levels are not 
connected to willingness to punish sharing norm infringements, as the Ultimatum 
Game has it, but to avoidance of obligation incurred by acceptance.  We also see in 
this quote that more money is not always better.  
 
External validity requires game design to incorporate salient cultural features from 
that external reality. If it does not, then the meaning of game behavior is uncertain 
since it is based on flawed assumptions, in this case about offers, rejections and 
acceptances, and the extrapolation to external reality becomes questionable.  
 
3.2 Plurality of cultures, norms and meanings:  
 
A further problem arises over the manner in which the external realities of cultures 
are described in these studies; they characterize cultures in rather monolithic and 
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generalizing ways with little discussion of internal divisions and contradictions; 
cultural stereotyping shadows the research. At times particular cultures are spoken 
of in terms of overarching sharing norms, and at others lower level norms, eg  
around meat sharing are invoked as evidence of fit with external reality.  We have 
little idea which of the multiple, competing and inconsistent norms at play in even 
one sphere of life (livelihood production and consumption, religious life, or 
whatever) are jostling in the minds of players during the games. Thus while 
McElreath (2004:344) explains differing proposals and rejections in relation to farmer 
and herder livelihoods, he remarks that, of course, the game may confuse several 
functionally unrelated elements of social lives – and proposers and responders may 
be drawing on different norms and thus effectively playing different games.   
 
The ideas which influence game behavior are not only pre-existing norms about 
sharing, fairness and cooperation, as the experimenters hope, and not only the moral 
costs and benefits Levitt and List refer to, but include a whole set of diverse ideas 
about money, goods and gifts, the social meaning of which is only partly about 
sharing as such.  
 
A reality check on the interpretations and extrapolations of game results on social 
preferences is sounded by Benz and Meier who comment on the fact that, outside of 
the lab, the same people seem to show very different social preferences depending on 
the context, and they conclude that ‘Individuals behaviour seems to be extremely 
situationally dependent and very hard to generalise – either because there are no 
cross-situational traits or because pro-social preferences are triggered differently in 
various settings. ..[P]eople’s behaviour correlates only weakly between various 
situations  - independent of whether the decision situations are inside or outside the 
lab.’ (2008: 280). Recently experiments have found that subject who chose to buy an 
ethical product in a supermarket were more selfish in the subsequent Dictator game, 
and more likely to lie and steal (Mazar and Chen-Bo 2010 ). They conclude that 
‘people do not make decisions in a vacuum; their decisions are embedded in a 
history of behaviours’ (2010:10); and that not only can one act, which creates a halo 
effect, licence an opposite behaviour (see also Monin and Miller 2001), but this may 
spread across domains, and thus a general sense of moral self influences, and 
licenses, pro- and anti social behaviour.  A certain quota of pro-social behaviour 
soothes a conscience, and is felt to legitimate selfishness.  
 
The problem of the consistency of results obtained from the same players in different 
games, is commented on by Gurven  (2004: 222) who asks, ‘If economic games 
capture real-life preferences, then how can no relationship exist between Ultimatum 
Game offers and Public Goods game contributions made by the same individuals?’.  
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3.3 Expectations about norms and behavior in experimental methods:   
 
Experimentalists assume that what players do in the experiment reveals the strength 
of norms of sharing and fairness, and thus how they assume norms produce actions 
is important for the interpretations given to game evidence. In game theory, norms 
are the conventions, the rules of thumb, which indicate appropriate behavior, but 
people only observe them if they are optimal for them. Experimental games 
approach norms in a clearly functionalist way – they work to coordinate action, they 
produce stability through general adherence, and they serve various institutions, eg 
trust is functional to markets.   Game behaviour is expected to display the norms 
which inform everyday life, and norms are the means by which institutions and 
social structures reproduce themselves.  
 
The universe of norms however is large and complex, with many contradictory 
norms, and alongside the hegemonic norms of how things ought to be done sit 
‘muted’ social structures (Jacobson-Wilding 1999) and subaltern norms. And they 
exist at many levels, from minor social conventions to life and death matters, and 
carry very different sanctions. Norms are ‘contingent claims that have to be ‘made to 
count’ through the effective mobilization of sanctions in the contexts of actual 
encounters’ (Giddens 1983: 30). However, actual encounters, theorized by Goffman, 
show social interaction in specific situations to be rather loosely geared to social 
structures and norms. For him, ‘Social situations can consolidate structural lines or 
loosen them’ (1983), and a bricolage of norms may be informing player’s choices. For 
game theorists norms govern behaviour as rules of thumb, unless over-ridden by 
rational self-interest, but to a social theorist of a more actor-oriented ilk, norms 
present an array of more or less sanctioned, sometimes ambiguous and 
contradictory, often unstable, social constraints and discursive resources with 
considerable room for interpretation by actors. Neither Goffman (1961), Giddens 
(1984) or Long (2001) would have expected game play to connect straightforwardly 
or easily to ‘real life’ behaviours. And how does the researcher know the difference 
between a player blindly following a norm, operating a counter-norm, inverting a 
norm, or deciding that the context suggests a domain of completely different norms, 
such as a real game does? 
 
The idea of external validity assumes a direct mirroring of behaviour in games and in 
‘real life’. But the labeling and framing of the encounter as a ‘game’ may suggest 
other relations to norms within the encounter. The whole point of a real game is that 
it is not real life. Games might be expected to be engrossing fun because they have 
uncertain outcomes, opportunities to display personal qualities valued in the wider 
world, to take risks and gamble character. What is therefore at stake in experimental 
games is always much more than the money stake. Far from simply acting in line 
with hegemonic sharing norms, a player engaged in ‘character contests’ may gain 
from counter-normative behaviour.  A game is partly bounded from the external 
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world; it is no longer fun if it is too close to reality or too far from it. ‘It seems .. that 
in games, and similar activities, disguises must be provided which check, but do not 
stop, the flow of socially significant matters into the encounter’   (Goffman 1961: 73).   
 
One of the MacArthur authors does briefly suggest an inversion of the ‘games 
reflecting real-life’ idea; Marlowe on the Hadza, finds a paradigmatically egalitarian 
society behaving in unegalitarian ways – their modal offer was 20% in the UG 
compared to the 50% among western students (2004: 175). Since everyday life 
involves a great deal of sharing Marlowe suggests that this behaviour is the reverse 
of games reflecting reality, for ‘the more frequently one must share, the more weary 
one grows of it, and the more one looks for any opportunity to escape it.’ (2004:187) 
Games could be just that – an act of resistance or an amusing diversion standing 
outside everyday rules. 
 
The arguments made for external validity seem to me strained and inconsistent, with 
little consideration of how far the terms of the discussion map from one culture to 
another, how plural is the universe of norms available for any particular context and 
how creative individuals are in their deployment of these norms They also have a 
limited specification of how norms are expected to relate to game behaviours – are 
they mirrored or inverted, determining of action or simply a backdrop to agentic 
manipulations? The terms of the discussion are not, in themselves, scrutinised cross-
culturally, ie what is generosity or altruism or selfishness or cooperation in other 
societies? And, critically, how do they see money, gifts and exchanges of various 
kinds, and how does this differ from western ideas? What are games in the cultures 
where these studies took place? The experiments may be rather casually labelled 
‘games’ but this is a clear signal to players. Finally, there is too little reflexivity in 
relation to how the game findings are patterned by the experimental exchange itself 
(Jackson  2009). There are several studies which hint at the influence of the 
researchers and their assistants in cueing the exercise of particular norms and thus 
the apparent application of sharing norms from the social institutions prefigured. 
The research assistants in the Orma study immediately saw the games as related to 
harambee (local self-help collective projects), and the players unsurprisingly came to 
this view too.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many of the authors of the component studies of the MacArthur collection are less 
ready to generalize findings or to accept game results as possessing external reality 
as readily as the overview essay does.  
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Interpreting game  behavior in terms of fairness norms was clearly problematic: fear 
of punishment or confrontation rather than fairness norms drove offer and 
acceptance levels, acceptance of low offers was connected to groupishness for the 
Tsimane (this retains the pay-off in the group rather than seeing it retained by the 
researcher) (Gurven 2004: 221); and offer rejections were seen as implying one is not 
a dupe (Alvard 2004: 425). Criticisms of the method included the lack of consistency 
of play across games, producing widely varied results for different games in the 
same locations, the difficulty of glossing a society as cooperative, or not, when there 
are elements of both in most, knowing which cooperative norms are exercised in 
games, the problem of knowing whether play is reflecting the norms of everyday 
livelihood cooperation (as most seek to find) or simply etiquette or manners (Gurven 
2004: 226). The most detailed account of the multiple misunderstandings and 
confusions about the experimental game is in Gil-White’s account of his Mongolian 
research, from which he concludes that ‘My methods, careful as they were, could not 
anticipate the great cultural gulf separating me from my respondents, for I could not 
have imagined some of the hypotheses they made concerning the object of the game.’ 
(2004: 273). The legion ambiguities deriving from the game design, and hypotheses, 
make interpretation of the meaning of game results challenging, and leaves an 
extremely wobbly foundation for the claims to external validity. 
 
Questions about external validity were also raised by Hill and Gurven, finding no 
association with real life behaviours (2004:408), and Gurven for the Tsimane who 
finds it hard to explain high variability between villages, and cautions against 
‘attempting to explain game results by fitting just-so anecdotal stories that capture 
key cultural traits’ (2004:225), while the generalization made about market 
integration and fairness norms finds very patchy support in individual analyses. 
  
Experimental games confront serious difficulties in making claims which rest on this 
evidence alone. What is required is a triangulation of game evidence with other 
sources, much better knowledge of cultural contexts and more carefully specified 
ideas of what exactly games are testing, greater researcher reflexivity, and a 
systematic debriefing after games to ascertain what frames and ideas informed play.  
The potential value of standard games designed in the west in other cultural contexts 
is questionable, and at the very least requires a hugely greater attention to local 
perceptions of the encounter.  
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